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One of the basic premises of early Buddhist thought is the claim that 
all conditioned things are impermanent. It is the nature and destiny of all 
things that they arise and perish; when their arising and perishing are 
extinguished, the bliss of nirviija is realized. The later Buddhists spec­
ulated about the impermanence/change of existence especially in relation 
to its momentariness: a moment is followed by another, and the succession 
of moments constitute the duration of existence. Thus the keen awareness 
of time was an integral part of Buddhist thought from its very inception. 
Yet, the problem of impermanence, and that of time for that matter, 
were treated mainly in the context of causality and other cognate phil­
osophical issues. That is, from the standpoint of Buddhist speculative 
interest, the problem of time was but a side issue; time as such was 
never considered to be pivotal in Buddhist thought metaphysically.* 1 
• This paper was originally presented, under the title of “Existence/Time as the 
Way of Spiritual Freedom,” for a panel on “Existence and Time in Ddgen” at the 30th 
annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies held March 31—April 2, 1978, in 
Chicago. In this connection, I would like to thank Professor Richard DeMartino of 
Temple University, who was the discussant of the panel, for calling my attention to 
Nishida Kitard’s notion of halaraku-mono kara mru-mono t ft< 
which is strikingly akin to Ddgen’s conception of ascesis as presented in this article.
1 The title of David J. Kalupahana’s recent work, Causality: The Central Philosophy 
of Buddhism (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1975), is indicative of such a 
persistent Buddhist concern. On the other hand, the Buddhists did speculate on time; 
for this see two essays by Hirakawa Akira and Ejima Yasunori on the early Buddhist, 
Abhidharma Buddhist, and Mah&y&na views on time, in Saigusa Mitsuyoshi, cd., 
Koza Bukkyo-shud, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Risfeha, 1974), pp. 181-269.
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On the other hand, from the standpoint of Buddhist religion, the idea 
of time was by and large associated with the painful and illusory character 
of life and reality; time as constitutive of man’s finitude was regarded, 
more often than not, as that aspect of existence which should be overcome 
and transcended, rather than penetrated and realized. For this reason, 
the negative overtones and undertones surrounding the meaning of time, 
coupled with such metaphors as bubbles, dreams, dews, and so forth, 
abounded in the Buddhist tradition.
Furthermore, in Buddhism as a whole, and especially in the MahSy^na 
tradition, the symbol of space seems to have played the predominant role 
in its religious imagination and philosophical speculation. The myriad 
worlds peopled with buddhas, bodhisattvas, and other countless forms of 
sentient, as well as insentient, beings occupied the sacred space of the 
Buddhist envisionment. The Hua-yen cosmology of all dharmas of the 
universe as mutually identical and interpenetrating in the absolute 
freedom of nonobstruction was very much, if not exclusively, spatially 
oriented. The metaphor of “empty space,” perhaps because of its sym­
bolic affinity with the idea of emptiness, was particularly favored in the 
Ch’an/Zen tradition, the fact of which indicates the key role played by a 
spatial orientation.J True, Hua-yen and Ch’an, as the two finest phil­
osophical and religious products of the Chinese mind, were the most 
practically and dynamically oriented schools of Buddhist thought; 
nevertheless, the awareness of time, if any, was overwhelmed and over­
shadowed by the dazzling vision of the sacred space of Vairocana or of 
Buddha-nature. As a whole, atemporality in their mode of thinking was 
undeniable.
In view of the foregoing cursory observations, the unique significance 
of DSgen’s contribution to the history of Buddhist thought lies in his 
attributing central importance to the problem of time. He reinstates this 
inconspicuous concept from its obscurity, thus placing it in relief at the 
very foundation of his religion and metaphysics. What is doubly remark­
able is the fact that Ddgen arrived at his thought by working from within
3 For the use of the metaphor of empty space in Ch’an/Zen, see Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, 
“The Characteristics of Oriental Nothingness*  in Philosophical Studies in Japan, no. 2 
(i960), pp. 65-97. The classical Ch’an/Zen treatment of time is well presented in 
D. T. Suzuki, “Ummon on Time,” The Eastern Buddhist, vol. 6, no. 2 (October 1973), 
PP-
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the Buddhist intellectual milieu, through his unique method of analysis 
of Buddhist concepts and symbols. Dogen has shown that an extremely 
suggestive theory of time can be derived from Buddhist thought itself.
This intellectual feat, however, is executed not from any speculative 
interest as such, which by the way he vehemently disdained, but from his 
existential and soteriological involvement in the very character of existence 
as inexorably impermanent and ultimately destined to death. DGgen’s 
life was deeply embedded in the ethos of medieval Japan of the early 
Kamakura period, which belonged to the so-called “Age of Degenerate 
Dharma” (mappd 5££fe). According to the traditional Buddhist view of 
history: the age was deeply troubled, dark, and helpless; life seemed 
fleeting, wearisome, and empty. DSgen lived and died in the midst of 
such pervasive ethos of despair, helplessness, and desperation; and 
quite understandably, the tragic sense of life is a persistent undercurrent 
of his thought.3 Thus the problem of existence and time in Dogen was 
part and parcel of living in the historical and cultural situation of medieval 
Japan.
5 As to Ddgen's life, see Hee-Jin Kim, Dogen Kigen—Mystical Realist (Tucson: The 
University of Arizona Press, 1975), chapter a.
* Throughout this paper we used the critical recension of the Shbbogenzo 
edited by Okubo DdshO in his Dogen zenji zenshu, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Chikuma shobd, 1969), 
hereafter cited as Sbgz.
In what follows we shall attempt to briefly delineate and elucidate some 
salient aspects of DSgen’s view of existence/time (uji with special 
attention given to its ascetic nature and function—“ascetic” in the original 
sense of the word, namely, practice or discipline as the way of spiritual 
freedom. Our guiding assumption throughout this paper is that the 
soteriological intention of Ddgen’s discourse can be better understood in 
terms of ascesis rather than vision: vision is not discredited, but penetrated, 
empowered by ascesis.
Selflwarld as radically individual and temporal
Perhaps one of the most striking characteristics of Dfrgen‘s view of time 
is an intensely personal and existential manner and tone of his presenta­
tion, especially in the Shibigenti, Uji*  The question of time is raised 
here not from a theoretical or speculative standpoint, but as we have 
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already observed, from the standpoint of Ddgen’s own personal concern 
with spiritual freedom. Thus it is inseparably bound with the total life of 
one’s existential self; the verity of time is invariably personal and individ­
ual. Time is, first of all, my time. To illustrate the case in point, we can 
adduce a few statements:
We should understand that my self, by unfolding itself in all 
things, constitutes the entire world, and that things and events 
of this entire world are temporal particularities.... My self 
unfolds itself, thereby it beholds this [scene]. Such is the truth 
that the self is time.
Essentially speaking, all existences of the entire universe are con­
tiguous to one another, yet constitute discrete times. Because of 
being existence/time, they are my existence/time.
Speaking of the foregoing example, when I waded rivers and 
ascended mountains, I was present; [hence] time belongs to me. 
If time does not have the aspect of coming and going, the 
moment of mountain-climbing is the absolute present of [my] 
cxistcncc/timc. [On the other hand,] if time possesses the aspect 
of coming and going [in the lived experience of existence/time], 
the absolute present of existence/time belongs to me. This is 
the meaning of existence/time.
We should understand thoroughly that unless I put forth the 
utmost exertion and live the inner dynamicity of time, not a 
single dharma, not a single thing will be realized, nor will it 
ever live out the inner dynamicity of time. [Sbgzt Uji]
In these quotations it is unequivocally expressed that the problem of 
time inevitably bears upon one’s personal fears and hopes, pains and 
pleasures, ambiguities and clarities which constitute the unadulterated 
particularity of one’s existence. In a sense, we might even say, though with 
utmost caution for the reasons that will presently become clear, that 
DSgen’s predominant concern is less the interrelationship between 
persons than the unique existence of a person. The irreplaceable unique­
ness and freedom of an individual being is the focal point of Ddgen’s 
religious-philosophical interest. Indeed we might say that DCgen was 
an individualist par excellence.
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Radical individuality, however, should not be construed as portraying 
a solitary, egocentric individuality in isolation from the rest of humanity 
and nature. Just as it is foundational to Buddhism that existence is 
fundamentally socio-cosmic and only derivatively individual, for existence 
originates from and is embedded in the universal law of dependent 
origination (pratitya^amutpMa), so is it to Ddgcn’s religion and meta­
physics. Nothing in the universe exists in and of itself; each and every 
being is interdependent on and penetrated by all other beings. In an 
oft-quoted statement Ddgcn observes:
To learn the Buddha-way is to learn one’s self; to learn one’s 
self is to forget one’s self; to forget one’s self is to be enlightened 
by myriad dharmas; and to be enlightened by myriad dharmas is 
to cast off the body and mind of self as well as those of other. 
All traces of enlightenment [thus] are wiped out, and life with 
traceless enlightenment goes on for ever and ever. [Sbgz*  Genjo- 
koan
In a similar vein Ddgen also has this to say:
It is delusion for one’s self to [mistakenly] practice and realize 
myriad dharmas by acting upon them; it is enlightenment for 
myriad dharmas to practice and realize one’s self through their 
advance in unison. [Those] who profoundly enlighten delusion 
are buddhas; [those] who are profoundly deluded in enlighten­
ment are sentient beings. [Thus] there arc persons who attain 
further enlightenment beyond enlightenment, [whereas] there 
are persons who arc more deluded amidst delusion. [Sbgz, 
Genjb-kdan]
The self and the world, man and cosmos, reality within and reality with­
out, in the enlightened man’s existence, arc coextensive and coctcmal, 
sharing their common roots and collaborating for common destinies.
Moreover, from the standpoint of Mah&y&na Buddhist religion, the 
idea) of the bodhisattva does not permit a selfish individualism. Individual 
liberation as such, in isolation from social liberation of all beings, is a 
contradiction in terms. The arousal of desirc-for-enlightenmcnt is inextri­
cably connected with the resolution to ferry across all beings to the other 
shore even when one has not yet crossed himself.
All these qualifications notwithstanding, Dogen’s thrust of radical 
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individuality cannot be doubted. The individuality with crystal-clear 
boundaries of self-identity is what emerges from the study of Ddgen’s 
view of the self. Individuality, seen in this light, does not comprise an 
aesthetic continuum in which the boundaries of each particularity melt 
away, in favor of an undifferentiated oneness of life. To put the matter 
differently, the self is neither the pointer to the Infinite, nor the end­
product of evolution, nor a self-contained psycho-physical entity; instead, 
as we shall examine later, the self, together with the world, constitute, 
in their nondual oneness, the bearer and enactor of ultimate reality, 
namely, Buddha-nature in DSgcn’s most cherished designation. Thus 
the radical individuality under consideration is unmistakably that of 
Buddha-nature. In this view Buddha-nature functions to radicalize in­
dividuality, not to devaluate it; the perfect transparency of individuality 
and Buddha-nature is called the “man of a particular rank” (ut-shinjin 
in contrast to Lin-chi’s “man of no rank” (mui-shinjin
At any rate the poignancy of Dogen’s entire thought, as we have 
intimated before, stems directly from his acute sensitivity to the im- 
permanence/dcath of existence, the magnitude of which is comparable 
to Shinran’s profound understanding of man’s passion-ridden existence. 
Herewith Ddgen’s search for spiritual freedom becomes not only individual 
but radically temporal.
Time and again throughout his writings5 6 Ddgcn reminds his monk­
disciples of the intimate relationship between the awareness of im- 
permanence/dcath and the dcsirc-for-enlightenmcnt. To him the essence 
of religion consists of the lucid understanding of life and the thorough 
penetration into death (rydshfi-lasshi T45SJE); and this begins and ends 
with a clear understanding of the meaning of impermanence. “The 
arising and decaying of all things occur swiftly,” thus admonishes Dogen. 
“Birth-and-death is gravely important” (Sbgz zuimonki, passim). The 
sense of impermanence is inseparably connected with the awareness of 
death:
5 Sbgz, Stishin-uuhb
6 Especially in Ddgen’s Shbbogtnzo zuimonki and Eihti shoso gakudo yojinshu, ftassim, 
in Okubo DoshQ, cd., Dogtn zmji ztnshu, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Chikuma shobd, 1970).
The student of the Buddha-dharma should think of the inevita­
bility of dying. The truth is quite obvious, so much so that he 
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may not even think of it with such an expression; yet, he should 
not waste his precious time by doing useless things, but instead do 
worthwhile things. Of many worthwhile things, just one—indeed 
all else is futile—is vitally important: the way of life of buddhas/ 
patriarchs. [Sbgz zuinwnJti, iii: 23]
In making these utterances Ddgen was no doubt a child of his age: 
like his medieval contemporaries in Kamakura Japan, impermanence 
was not impersonal and abstract as understood in the succession of 
moments or point-instants, but instead it was the deeply felt quality of 
life and reality. Yet he went beyond them by cosmicizing and ontologiz- 
ing the problem at hand so that impermanence/death was now regarded 
as structurally inherent in man and the universe, hence as that ‘‘factuality” 
which should be treated religiously as well as metaphysically. As a result 
his solution consisted neither in a speculative study in the momentariness 
of existence, nor in a transcendental flight from the unbearable reality 
of impermanence, nor in an aesthetic indulgence in the fleeting beauty of 
life, but in the recognition and actualization of what impermanence truly 
meant to be. The impermanence of finite existence is not to be trans­
cended so much as to be realized. This is the gist of “realization” (genjo 
9J&), or of “freedom in penetration” (tidalsu 3R). A radical temporaliza- 
tion of his understanding of man and the universe naturally follows from 
this recognition.
Dogen’s view of impermanence is nowhere more explicit than in his 
analysis of the notion of impermanence/Buddha-nature (mujd-busshb 
In his usual, critical manner, Ddgen approaches the widely- 
held contention that Buddha-nature is permanent and thus spiritual 
freedom consists in departure from the world’s impermanence, and argues 
for its untenability. Taking up a well-known statement of the Nirvdqa 
Sutra, “Buddha-nature is always abiding; all dharmas are arising and 
perishing,” Ddgcn contends that impermanence is Buddha-nature and 
that its inverse is also true. A good MahSyanist, Ddgen is here quite con­
sistent with the fundamental religio-philosophical foundation of the 
tradition he was nurtured in, which can be epitomized in the formula of 
the Heart Sutra, “form is emptiness; emptiness is form.” Thus not only 
impermanence is Buddha-nature, but Buddha-nature is impermanence, 
because both are bound to be “arising and perishing.” Nevertheless, from 
the standpoint of the generally held view of the abiding character of 
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Buddha-nature, which incidentally must have been quite widespread 
in those days, Dogen’s is certainly a shocking assertion.
Although we cannot dwell on Ddgen’s view of Buddha-nature at 
length,’ it is already abundantly clear: Buddha-nature no longer has 
a preeminent metaphysical status of its own in the sense that it is absolutely 
independent of all dharmas and that hence it is immune to change and 
modification; although it is not a dharma, yet like all other dharmas, 
Buddha-nature is empty of self-existence and shares its workings with all 
dharmas. Impermanence in light of this view is far from being devaluated, 
but on the contrary, sacralized with ultimate value and significance. 
Dogen writes:
The impermanence of grasses and trees, thickets and woods, is 
none other than Buddha-nature. Men and things, body and 
mind, arc impermanent, hence the very Buddha-nature. Nations 
and lands, mountains and rivers, are impermanent because they 
themselves arc Buddha-nature. Supreme enlightenment, because 
it is Buddha-nature, is impermanent; great nirvana, because 
it is impermanent, is Buddha-nature. Btissho J
What is original in Dogen, however, is the thought that both Buddha- 
nature and all dharmas are mediated by activity-unremitting and 
expression. Since we shall consider the latter two notions later on in this 
paper, suffice it to say at this juncture that impermancncc/Buddha- 
nature is now associated with the dynamic, ascetic qualities of reality. 
Thus it is not surprising to read such statements as: “The impermanent 
themselves expound, enact, and realize impermanence—all should be 
impermanent**  (Sbgz, Buss ho). The traditional idea of impermanence is 
appropriated here in terms of the self-enactment of impermanence 
in the cosmic scale.
Then the notion of permanence, which inevitably accompanies that of 
impermanence, is dealt with in a manner which is consistent with what 
we have seen in the preceding few paragaphs. “Whether [a person] be­
comes an enlightened one cutting off delusions or manifests himself as a 
worldly one to be liberated from them,” says Ddgcn, “(his changes] do not 
necessarily have to do with the traces of their coming and going” (Sbgz,
7 For Ddgen’s view of Buddha-nature, »ee Abe Masao, “Ddgen on Buddha Nature,” 
The Eastern Buddhist, vol. 4, no. 1 (May 1971), pp. 2B-71; Kim, of>. til., pp. 160-227.
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Busshd}.*  This is a crucially important statement which shows Ddgen’s 
ascetic interpretation of permanency. Indeed permanence cannot mean 
the eternity, immutability, or indestructibility of a metaphysical entity 
any more than Buddha-nature can refer to a cosmic source of which all 
dharmas are created: it cannot be referential. Nor can the notion of 
permanency be understood in terms of transcendence as opposed to 
immanence. As we have intimated a moment ago, phenomenality and 
absoluteness are nondually one in Buddha-nature. If this is the case, what 
Dogen is suggesting in the aforequoted statement is that the permanence 
in question signifies the mode of selfless, liberated existence of Buddha- 
nature through which activity-unremitting/expression is totally exerted 
and totally free from its traces or taints. In short, “permanence” refers 
to the unchanging quality of absolutely free, ascetic existence on the 
part of both Buddha-nature and all dharmas. For this reason, it has 
nothing to do with metaphysical entity but with soteriological act. To 
use Ddgen’s favorite expressions, an impermanent existence realizes itself 
in the impermanent world and “casts off its body-mind” (shinjin-dalsuraku 
and thereby is “undefiled” (Juzenna so as to
• The original mitm for permanence, literally, means "nontuming” or “prior- 
to-turning.”
ever create, transform, and renew its being. Permanence points to such an 
unfailing actuality of Buddha-nature and universal possibility of all 
dharmas. All in all, it means the mode of being/becoming of Buddha- 
nature/all dharmas.
The total exertion of the present
The radical temporalization of the problem of existence/time in Dogen 
is closely related to his critique of the quantitative view of time. The 
people commonly speak of a day in terms of “the twelve hours” as though 
time were divided and segmentalized in some measurable, homogeneous 
units, and these temporal units progressed mechanically in a one­
dimensional, sequential manner regardless of the experiential qualities 
of existence; the event of existence thus is but an episode or an appearance 
on the stage of the impersonal passage of time, as though existence were 
in time. Thus the beginningless and endless succession of now-moments 
constitutes the backdrop of human dramas.
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Also similar to this is the common way of speaking of time in quasi­
physical terms such as “long or distant, short or quick,” “flowing,” 
“flying,” or “coming and going” (Sbgzt Uji). For example, often in the 
hurly-burly of mundane life, where the tempo of surrounding realities is 
outrunning that of our biological and psychological existence, we vaguely 
experience the transience of life, and use some such expressions.9 Under 
such circumstances, the manner in which the people speak of their 
experiences must be carefully examined and understood. In the tone 
of a critical appreciation, Dogen observes: “If time were exclusively 
dependent on flying, there would be an interval [between time and self]. 
The people cannot grasp the truth of existence/time, because they con­
ceive it to be only passing away” (Sbgz, Uji).10
9 Karaki Junzd, Muj5 (Tokyo: Chikuma shob6, 1974), pp- 1—18 concerning the 
analysis of hakanashi.
10 Regarding Ch'an/Zen critique of the common-sense view of time, see Suzuki’s 
aforementioned essay, "Ummon on Time.”
These conventional ways of describing time have the fundamental 
assumption of a dualism between time and existence. In contrast to such 
a common-sense view, Dogen proposes the nondualistic equation of 
existence and time. Time itself is existence; existence is invariably time. 
Dogen does not say that existence is in time, but instead, that existence 
is time. As Dogen sees the matter, time cannot be meaningfully talked 
about apart from the personal qualities of self/world, which we observed 
in the preceding section, and existence, in turn, though empirically 
characterized in terms of space, time, and causality, is preeminently 
temporal in its innermost existentiality. The net result is a radical tem- 
poralization of existence and a radical existentialization of time.
Thus the following observation is made:
Mountains are time, oceans arc time. If they were not, there 
would be neither mountains nor oceans. Do not say that moun­
tains and oceans are not temporal at this moment of eternal 
present. If time perishes, mountains and oceans will perish as 
well; if time does not, they will not, either. [Sbgz, Up]
It follows from this that time has shapes, colors, smells, sounds, and so 
forth. Quite consistent with the traditional Buddhist position, time is 
denied its own self-same entity but construed as the bearer of the events of 
self/world. The particularities of existence and those of time are not two 
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different sets of realities but one and the same. That is, “all existence” 
(Jin’u <£ ) is “all time” (Jinji ®ty).
What differentiates Ddgen from the traditional view of Buddhism is 
that the nonduality of existence and time is appropriated in the manner 
of ascesis rather than in that of vision. Ddgen says:
There is only one thing for us to do—to totally live the truth 
that all time is all existence. There is no dharma extraneous to 
this, because “extraneous dharma” by definition means what it 
means. Even half-exerted existence/time is the total exertion 
of half existence/time. Even what appears to be mistaken is 
itself existence/time. Going a step further along this line, even 
before and after you have made a mistake, you always abide in 
existence/time. Living vigorously in one’s Dharma-situation— 
this is existence/time. [Sbgzt Uji]
Dogen’s ascetic intention is quite clear in these statements, but more will 
be said of this presently.
Such existence/time invariably presents itself as the present. That is, 
existence/time is realized as the absolute present. “No matter how many 
periods—even tens of thousands of them—you may think of, they con­
sist of the present, the absolute now. Each person’s share of being lies 
invariably in the present,” Ddgen says (Sbgz, Daigo Similarly, the
following statement is made: “All existences and all worlds are realized 
in each temporal particularity. Just meditate upon this for a moment: 
Is any existence or any world excluded from this present moment?” 
(Sbgz, Uji).
The present in this view is sharply different from an intermediate 
position between a before and an after in the series of homogeneous now­
points. This is the reason that when Ddgen refers to a familiar theme of 
the identity of time and dharmas, he means much more than the ordinary 
time: “[In ‘When these dharmas arise,’] when-arise is thtse-dharmas, yet 
it is not the twelve hours. Thtse-dharmas is when-arise, yet it differs from 
the triple world arising in rivalry” (Sbgz, Kaiin-zammai Thus
existence/time as the present must be unequivocally differentiated from 
any dualistic conceptions adduced here in terms of “the twelve hours” 
and “the triple world arising in rivalry.”
Thus Ddgen analyzes the problem of the present from a soteriological 
standpoint. For example, he states:
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An ancient buddha asked: “What is time—incessantly arising 
and perishing—like?” As is clear from this, arising and perishing 
mean that self arises in and of itself and perishes in and of itself, 
and that it never halts. This expression never-halts should be 
understood in such a way that arising or perishing is total arising 
or total perishing. This time-incessanily-arising-and-ptrishing pul­
sates as the life of buddhas/patriarchs. Kmin-zammai]
From what we have observed before, the never-halts cannot imply the 
continuity of now-moments; it is not the process of succession. Rather 
it is the event of total arising or total perishing. It is total time in this 
respect. From the standpoint of causality, nothing comes into being and 
goes out of being in and of itself; yet from the standpoint of spiritual 
freedom, any and every dharma does exist in and of itself. This is not 
the denial of causality but the temporalization of it. Temporality and 
ascesis are inextricably interfused here.
It is from this perspective that Ddgen writes about the Dharma-situation 
(hoi which is his ascetic way of speaking of the present:
When firewood becomes ash, it can no longer revert to firewood. 
But we should not regard ash as following and firewood as 
preceding. Take note that firewood abides in its own Dharma­
situation and has before and after, and that although possessing 
before and after, it is cut off from them. Ash abides in its Dharma­
situation and is possessed of before and after. Just as firewood 
does not change to firewood again after its having been burnt to 
ash, so death is no longer transformed into birth after man is 
dead. Accordingly, it has been a long-established view of 
the Buddha-dharma not to speak of birth becoming death; for 
this reason it is called “no-origination.” It is [also] a traditional 
teaching in the Buddha-dharma that death docs not change 
to birth; hence it is called “no-extinction.” Birth is a situation of 
total time, death is a situation of total time as well. They are 
likened to the winter and the spring. We do not think that the 
winter turns into the spring, or say that the spring becomes the 
summer. \Sbgzt Genjo-kban]
Whether it be firewood or ash, birth or death, the winter or the spring— 
each has its own Dharma-situation which is absolutely discrete and
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discontinuous. Each has its “before” and “after,” but is cut off from those 
Dharma-situations “preceding” and “following.” However, note that 
these expressions are not made in the manner of “the twelve hours” or 
of “the triple world arising in rivalry” or in terms of any conventional 
view. The Dharma-situation in question is extremely similar to what 
Heidegger had in mind when using the Greek word “tpoche” in his analysis 
of time and being.11 In any event Dogen’s view is a most radical advocacy 
of the discontinuity of existence/time, thereby denying the present as 
an instance of any linear, evolutionary process or of any nexus of things 
spatially contiguous. In this respect, we can say that “time does not pass” 
(Sbgz, Uji), without necessarily implying a static conception of time.
11 Martin Heidegger, On Timt and Bring, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper 
& Row, 197a), p. 9. “To hold back is, in Greek, tpochr. Hence we speak of the epochs of 
the destiny of Being. Epoch does not mean here a span of time in occurrence, but rather 
the fundamental characteristic of sending, the actual holding-back of itself in favor of 
the discernibility of the gift, that is, of Being with regard to the grounding of beings.”
Because of its centrality in understanding Dogen’s view of existence/ 
time, the notion of “abiding in the Dharma-situation” (Ju-hdi <£&&) 
should be examined in some detail at this juncture. Existence/time, as 
the present, is now conceived in terms of abiding in the Dharma-situation. 
To begin with, a Dharma-situation is a dharma’s particular spatio­
temporal existence sacralized with its absolute significance in the total 
scheme of things. Each and every dharma, whether it be a flower in the 
field or a piece of rock in the river, has absolute, irreplaceable value in 
and of itself. As we have seen before, there is no denial here of its coming 
into being through the law of dependent origination. But the emphasis 
in the notion of Dharma-situation is placed on the dharma’s absolute 
discontinuity with and independence of other dharmas. Thus continuity 
and interdependence in the context of causation recedes to the back­
ground. With respect to human existence, a Dharma-situation is a 
present with uniquely personal values, meanings, and experiences; the 
phenomenal and existential qualities are, in the least, devaluated. 
Nevertheless, these values and qualities arc not merely personal and 
subjective, but a Dharma-state in the sense that in and through this 
particular Dharma-situation the totality of Buddha-nature enacts and 
realizes itself. For this reason, the Dharma-situation is in no way a self­
limiting manifestation or a temporal instance of eternity, but the totality
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of eternity itself. It is what Dogcn calls realization/kdan (genj6-kdan 
In short, a Dharma-situation is a radically temporal situation 
of eternity.
Inseparable from the notion of the Dharma-situation is that of “the 
total exertion of a single dharma” (ippd-gUjin — &&>). “A single dharma” 
bears the meaning of a single existence as well as of that existence which 
realizes all dharmas in it. Dogcn is cautious to remind us that the total 
experience of all dharmas does not deprive a single dharma of its own 
unique particularity.12 This is significant because D5gen here seems very 
much in line with Hua-yen Buddhism’s totalistic vision of the 
Dharmadhatu of shih-shih-wu-ai J., jijimugc) in which all
things of the universe are mutually identical and interpenetrated with 
each other in perfect freedom. Dazzling and brilliant as its cosmic vision 
may be, Hua-yen Buddhism, however, is still very much contemplative 
in its orientation and methodology. DSgcn’s emphasis, in contrast, is, 
through and through, an ascetic appropriation of nonduality in such 
a way that the whole universe is crystallized into the unique historical 
singularity of an individual dharma. Spiritual energy in Hua-yen moves 
centrifugally, whereas in Dogen it moves centripetally; dharmas in the 
former, thus, are diffused in the harmony of nonobstruction, but in the 
latter (in Dogcn) they are condensed into a single dharma. Thus a 
single dharma, as totally exerted, becomes the total cause for the totality 
of all dharmas—the total cause that involves all causes and all effects; 
the whole universe is transformed into the single dharma’s selfless ascesis 
in absolute freedom.
The centripetal focalization of all dharmas into the total exertion of 
a single dharma is characterized in still another way in terms of “total 
dynamism” or “total function” (zenki ±&). In his analogy of sailing in 
a boat, the existence/time of the boat is described as follows:
At such a time, there is nothing but the boat’s world. The 
heavens, the water, and the shore—all become the boat’s time; 
certainly, it is not the same as the time that is not of the boat. 
Hence, I make life what it is; life makes me what I am. By riding 
in the boat, one’s body and mind, as well as the self and the 
world, are together the dynamic function of the boat. The entire 
existence/time
great earth and the whole empty space are alike in company with 
the boat’s dynamic working. Such is the I that is life, the life 
that is I. [Sbgz, Zenti]
All dharmas cooperate in concerted efforts to bring forth the total 
exertion of a single dharma. As A. N. Whitehead said, “The whole world 
conspires to produce a new creation.”13
” A. N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936), 
P- 99-
14 Sbgz, Uji. The original reads: iore jinkai 0 mote jinkai 0 kaijin run -tit® Jlfc t X® J!- 
tJMH-S.
The ascetic appropriation of the mutual identity and interpenetration 
of a single dharma and all dharmas must go still a step further: it is to be 
cast off. Dogen writes for example:
Origination is a situation of total time and has indeed before 
and after; accordingly, in the Buddha-dharma origination 
itself is said to be no-origination. Extinction also is a situation of 
total time and possesses before and after; hence, extinction itself 
is said to be no-extinction. When you speak of origination, there 
is nothing but origination; when you speak of extinction, there 
is nothing but extinction. For this reason you should surrender 
yourselves totally to origination, when origination comes, and 
to extinction, when extinction comes. Do not hate them; do 
not desire them. [Sbgz, Shoji
Thus “a single dharma” involves one dharma, all dharmas, and no­
dharma; thereupon it is the total dharma.
The total exertion, as the ascetic dimension of a single dharma, is 
expounded as the act of absolutely and thoroughly enacting the entire 
world with the entire world: the self-exertion of the entire world in and 
through itself.14 For this reason, the total exertion comprises not only 
mere human efforts on the part of an individual, psychological, in­
tellectual, moral or otherwise, but more importantly, the totality of self/ 
world and Buddha-nature. In this respect total exertion is that soteriologi- 
cal act in which a single dharma is chosen and enacted not dualistically 
but nondualistically. In other words, by virtue of its total exertion, a 
single dharma is no longer one among all dharmas, but the total dharma 
that is all there is in the universe. For example, sitting in meditation 
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is thoroughly and absolutely enacted in the nondualistic mode of ascesis 
so that there is nothing but that sitting in the entire world, all other things 
being realized together in and through it.
Yet by far the most typically Dogen-like expression with respect to the 
idea of total exertion runs as follows: “Obstruction hinders obstruction, 
thereby obstruction beholds itself; obstruction obstructs obstruction—such 
is time” (Sbgz, Uji). As he often does elsewhere in the Shdbdgenzb, Ddgen 
uses the word “obstruction” (ge *,  a shortened form of keige Jg®) in the 
sense of “self-obstruction,” in which a dharma is “obstructed” by itself, 
thus exerting itself in absolute freedom. Moreover, the noun “obstruction” 
in the Japanese original in this quote is used in a verb from, which is 
another characteristic of Dogen’s diction. We might say, “the universe 
universe-s the universe,” “a mountain mountain-s a mountain,” and 
so forth. The prototypal expression “obstruction obstructs obstruction,” 
in the final analysis, signifies that a single dharma realizes itself—and 
the entire world for that matter—by enacting its whole being thoroughly 
and absolutely in a radically nondualistic manner. Herein we see the 
crux of Ddgen’s entire thought in which nonduality is appropriated not 
in a visionary fashion but in an ascetic, soteriological manner.14 5
14 Heidegger, of>. cit., p. 24. HU shift away from metaphysics in speaking of “four
dimensional true time” may be comparable to Ddgen’s effort to move in the direction 
of ascesis.
When we compare Ddgen’s logic of the total exertion of a single dharma 
with the Diamond Sutra's logic of identity-and-difference, “A is not-A; 
therefore, A is A,” or with Yiin-m^n Wdn-ycn’s tautological statement, 
“Mountains arc mountains, waters are waters,” in the Ch’an tradition, 
it seems evident that Ddgen is philosophically more emphatic and explicit 
than traditional Buddhists in stressing the centrality of ascesis which is 
the hallmark of Ch’an/Zen. In the logics of identity-and-difference 
and of tautology, it is often criticized, rightly or wrongly, that spiritual 
freedom in Ch’an/Zen is attained at the expense of obfuscation of con­
flicts, antitheses, paradoxes—human, all too human qualities of existence. 
One of the most serious implications of such a criticism is that nonduality 
in Ch’an/Zen is incomplete, and even inconsistent with its fundamental 
notion of emptiness. Be that as it may, the ascetic dynamism of total 
exertion abhors any slight devaluation of these existential qualities which 
form what Dogen calls “the authentic human embodiment” (shinjitsu- 
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niniai MW A#). In this regard Dogen seems to have pursued more rig­
orously and consistently the ascetic implications of Ch’an/Zen.
Activity and ex/nession
We are now in a position to scrutinize Ddgen’s further elaboration on 
the last statement made in the preceding section. It is already abundantly 
clear from the foregoing investigation that when Dogen speaks of existence 
and time, his position of thoroughgoing nondualism often runs counter 
to familiar mystical notions such as “timelessness,” “ineffability,” 
“nondifferentiation,” and so forth. If the appellation “mysticism” is 
applicable to Dogen’s thought, his is not so much the matter of seeing 
things differently as that of creating things differently; his mysticism 
concerns itself with transforming rather than seeing as such. Ddgen 
delves deeply in this direction in his treatment of existence and time: 
that is, existcncc/time as the way of ascesis is now dealt with in terms of 
two fundamental notions of Ddgen’s religion and metaphysics: activity- 
unremitting (gyoji frft) and expression (dotoku &#). These ideas will be 
examined one by one in what follows.
Activity-unremitting which means sustained and sustaining spiritual 
practice is the essential nature of existence/time, and of Buddha-nature 
for that matter. It is not confined to only observable, behavioral actions, 
but more importantly, includes man’s innermost secrets and aspirations, 
as well. All the events of the world, from the subatomic realities to the 
galactic ones, originate from the workings of activity-unremitting.
The sun, moon, and stars exist by virtue of this activity-unremit­
ting; the great earth and empty space, our body-mind and its 
environments, the four elements and the five skandhas—all 
exist by virtue of this activity-unremitting. Although activity- 
unremitting is not what the worldly people are fond of [seeking], 
it is the ultimate matrix to which they should return. [Sbgz, Gjriji]
Furthermore, the following is stated:
That activity-unremitting which actualizes me, when [its 
workings are] hidden at the moment, is beyond my com­
prehension with respect to what conditions of dependent 
origination bring it forth. The reason for this is that the compre­
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hension of activity-unremitting reveals nothing particularly 
novel. It should be carefully examined and thoroughly under­
stood that dependent origination is activity-unremitting, because 
activity-unremitting [itself] is not brought forth by [the con­
ditions of] dependent origination. [Sbgz, Gjty'i]
Note that Ddgen goes so far as to say that activity-unremitting is more 
primitive than even dependent origination: activity-unremitting, as Dogen 
sees it, is not a dharma whose existence is interdependent on the conditions 
of dependent origination, nor is it itself dependent upon the law of 
dependent origination. Activity-unremitting, as the primordial creative 
force, makes the process of dependent origination possible, not the other 
way around. Here Ddgen seems to have advanced an important philo­
sophical step further beyond the top of a hundred-foot pole, to use 
a Ch’an/Zen expression. Nag&ijuna’s (and Mahayana’s for that matter) 
fundamental insight into the nonduality of emptiness and dependent 
origination already has in it the dynamic, creative outlook of life and 
reality. It is manifest particularly in the East Asian forms of Mahayana 
Buddhism such as Hua-yen, as we have alluded to before. Dogen, how­
ever, makes this absolutely explicit and unmistakable, by elevating the 
notion of activity-unremitting to a metaphysical eminence. Thus activity- 
unremitting is fundamental not only sotcriologically but also meta­
physically. Its metaphysical import has not as yet been properly ap­
preciated by Ddgen students. In any event, the result is that emptiness/ 
dependent origination is immensely enriched and empowered; its creative 
implications are made unequivocally manifest.
Parenthetically speaking, Ddgcn’s notion of activity-unremitting is 
strikingly similar to the Pure Land Buddhist notion of Amitabha’s 
original vow-power. One is the primordial ascesis, where the other the 
primordial compassion. Herein lies the fundamental difference between 
Ddgen and, say, Shinran—a difference not in kind but in emphasis. Both 
activity-unremitting and original vow-power are symbolic of the pri­
mordial, self-liberating power of reality.
Now Dogen continues:
That which actualizes such [primordial] activity-unremitting is 
none other than our activity-unremitting of the present. The 
present of activity-unremitting is not the original being abiding 
from the beginning in the self, nor is the present of activity-
do 
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unremitting something that enters and leaves the self. [The time] 
expressed as the present does not precede activity-unremitting; 
[the event of] activity-unremitting realized is called [the time of] 
the present. [Sbgz, Gyoji]
As it is clear in these statements, the present is indivisibly bound up with 
activity-unremitting, so as to actualize itself always as “the present of 
activity-unremitting.” In brief, time and ascesis are here self-identical, 
and contemporaneously realized. Inasmuch as the primordial character 
of activity-unremitting is conjoined with the present, activity-unremitting 
becomes the bond between existence/time and Buddha-nature. Seen in 
this light, the ground, the path, and the goal of spiritual freedom con­
sist in activity-unremitting.
Such spiritual freedom is prototypally expressed in zazen-only (shikan- 
taza which to Ddgen was none other then the self­
enactment of the Way (bendo Mitt)*  This is why he thinks that truth lies 
in the authenticity or inauthenticity of ascesis, neither the superiority 
or inferiority of doctrine nor the deepness or shallowness of teaching.’6 
Hence zazen-only, or the enactment of the Way, is not a part of birth- 
and-death; rather birth-and-death is an outreaching or flowering of 
zazen-only. As Ddgen puts it, we see birth-and-death through the enact­
ment of the Way; we do not enact the Way in birth-and-death.16 7 By 
the same token, activity-unremitting in Ddgen’s view should not be 
construed as part of spiritual freedom; the truth of the matter is that 
the latter is the unfoldment of the former.
16 Sbgz, Btndowa MjttlS.
” Sbgz,Gjriji.
The present of activity-unremitting, furthermore, is elaborated on as 
that activity-unremitting which perpetuates itself as “the ring of the 
Way” (dokan ittM) with no beginning and no end. Since this notion will 
be discussed later in a different context, let us just underscore at this 
point that activity-unremitting has its self-expression not only in the 
present but also in the advance of the Way through history.
Activity-unremitting is inseparably connected with another cognate 
idea “expression,” which in Ddgen is as equally primitive as the former. 
At one place Ddgen puts it this way: “While enactment fathoms a path 
leading to exposition, exposition possesses a path leading to enactment.
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Thereupon, one expounds all day long, wherein one enacts all day long” 
(Sbgz9 Gjfiji). Enactment and exposition (i.c., activity-unremitting 
and expression) are originally one and the same, and exist primordially 
“in the beginning.” Thus any and every activity-unremitting is expres­
sive, any and every expression is unremittingly active.
Furthermore, as in the case of activity-unremitting, expression does 
not mean utterance in spoken words alone; that which is not said, yet 
deeply and vividly felt, is an expression. Thus silence is a form of ex­
pression as well. Dogen apparently had this thought in mind when he 
wrote: “Although we say that the ultimate experience of enlightenment 
is swiftly actualized, [the state in which] we intimately have it does not 
necessarily constitute [concrete] actualization” {Sbgz^ Genjo-koan). 
Intimate having (rnttoti 3J#) and concrete actualization (genjb &J#., Jl$) 
are mediated by activity-unremitting/expression which is the essence of 
the primordial ascesis, so that both partake of its urge to express and act 
out.
With respect to expression in relation to temporality, D6gen has the 
following to say:
When buddhas/patriarchs inquire about buddhas/patriarchs and 
understand their expression, such expression will naturally be 
unfolded in the spiritual life of three years, of eight years, of 
thirty years, or of forty years, expressing itself through and 
through....
In this case there are no interruptions in expression even for 
the period of those many decades. In view of this, realization- 
by-seeing at the time of enlightenment must be authentic. As 
realization-by-seeing-then was true, it is no doubt realization-by- 
saying-now. Accordingly, realization-by-saying-now is endowed 
with realization-by-seeing-then, and realization-by-seeing-then 
is in possession of realization-by-saying-now. Thus realization- 
by-saying exists now, realization-by-sceing exists now. Realiza­
tion-by-saying-now and realization-by-seeing-then are ever one 
in their perpetuation. Our spiritual efforts now arc being sus­
tained by realization-by-saying and realization-by-sceing. [Sbgz, 
Dbtoku]
What interests us most in these statements is, among others, that realiza- 
tion-by-seeing-then for D6gen is not a contemplative vision of the pre­
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established harmony nor a mystical absorption in the metaphysical Ab­
solute. Seeing is always pregnant with the possibilities of saying; saying 
is ever open to the possibilities of seeing. This dynamic interpenetration 
of seeing and saying is the meaning of the statement: "Our spiritual 
efforts now are being sustained by realization-by-saying and realization- 
by-seeing.” Just as intimate having and concrete actualization are firmly 
grounded in activity-unremitting/expression, so arc seeing-then and 
saying-now. The latter, however, should not be viewed in terms of 
a causal relationship, but in terms of realization in the present. "Then” 
and “now” are thus realized in the absolute present. As we understand 
the so-called seeing into one’s own nature (chien-hsing\ kcnsho Jilt) from 
this perspective, it should be construed as seeing/saying from one’s own 
nature, thereupon expressing and acting out one’s own nature.1*
The other side, of one and the same coin, of expression is nonexpression 
(fudStoku
... when this expression exerts itself to the utmost, we realize 
that nonexpression has been nonexpressed. Even if we suppose we 
have understood expression fully and completely, yet do not 
penetrate into the truth of nonexpression in its total exertion, 
we arc still short of attaining the original countenance of 
buddhas/patriarchs as well as the bones and marrow of buddhas/ 
patriarchs. [Sbgz, Dttoku]
Nonexpression here may sound very much like the notion of ineffability 
in the mystical tradition; no doubt, the latter has also its legitimate 
place in Ddgcn to a certain extent. Dogen’s intention, however, lies 
neither in the impossibility of expression nor is it in silence in opposi­
tion to speech; nonexpression, as yet “nonexpressed” (n.b., not “un­
expressed”), totally exerts itself in and through expression, constantly 
casting off an expression so as to give being to a new expression. There­
fore, nonexpression does not mean acquiescence before the limitations 
of language but, on the contrary, unceasing transformation and renewal 
of language beyond its limitations, despite those limitations. Essentially 
speaking, nonexpression is expression, expression is nonexpression. Thus 
expression/nonexpression is the primordial form of ascesis.
’• Sbgz, Shizm-biku fflWftJr where DCgen severely criticizes the idea of seeing into 
one’s own nature and goes so far as to regard the Platform Sutra as spurious.
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Such a conception of expression is directly related to Ddgen’s refined 
sensitivity to poetic and expressive language and his rigorous analysis of 
the symbolic intricacy or" language and thought, which are characteristic 
of his methodology.1* These language- and symbol-related activities, in 
turn, are none other than “the Way’s grasping” or “the Way’s seizure,” 
which is implied by the words such as dotoku, doshu and the like, 
so often used by Dogen. That is, our linguistic and symbolic efforts are 
not excluded from the purview of the Way’s appropriation.
Concerning Dogen’s methodology along the lines here suggested, see Kim, op til.,
chapter 3.
30 D. T. Suzuki, Etsajs in Zen Buddhum, First Series (London: Rider, 1949), p. 229.
21 Ibid., p. 230.
21 Ibid., p. 231.
22 D. T. Suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture (New York: Pantheon Books, 1959), p. 27.
24 Lot. til.
Thus far we have seen the dynamic relation of existence/time to activity- 
unremitting/expression. What existence/time is to form, activity- 
unremitting/exprcssion is to content. We have endeavored to understand 
Ddgen’s philosophical penetration into the inner workings of the ascesis 
of existence/time. It may be fruitful, at this point, to compare Dogen 
with Daisetz T. Suzuki. While both thinkers are in the same Zen tradition 
and hence share its basic presuppositions, they arc significantly different 
in many respects. Suzuki writes that “The essence of Zen Buddhism 
consists in acquiring a new view point of looking at life and things gener­
ally.”20 This acquirement of a new point of view is called “satori,” which 
is further explained as follows: “Satori may be defined as an intuitive 
looking into the nature of things in contradistinction to the analytical 
or logical understanding of it. Practically, it means the unfolding of a 
new world hitherto unperceived in the confusion of a dualistically- 
trained mind.”* 2* Here Suzuki is saying that satori is not only a form of 
intuitive perception, which is quite evident in his translation of prajni 
as “prajfia-intuition,” but also a form of intellection opposed to analytic 
and logical thinking which he calls “transcendental intellectualism.”22 
This position is directly related to his interpretation of Zen as inevitably 
artistic. For example, Suzuki says: “Zen finds its inevitable association 
with art but not with morality. Zen may remain unmoral but not without 
art.”23 It is clear from this that Suzuki relates his transcendental in- 
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tcllectualism with “aesthetic impulses” which in his view are said to 
“more primitive or more innate than those of morality.”2* Thus it is 
quite natural for him to say that “Zen is ... at once antinomian and 
disciplinarian.”25 Despite his otherwise quite legitimate abhorrence of 
any bifurcation of reality, Suzuki’s view seems to leave a rather uneasy 
cleavage between morality and art, between prajna and vijnana, between 
prajfii-intuition and meditation.25 To be sure, this cursory treatment does 
not do full justice to the complexity and subtlety of Suzuki’s view 
of Ch’an/Zen; yet the manner of his speaking of this tradition leaves no 
doubt about his strong predilection toward intuitionism and aesthe­
ticism—which are almost solely the terms in which Ch’an/Zen has been 
currently understood in the West.27
29 Ibid., p. 274.
39 See also idem, Studies in Z«i (London: Rider, 1955), p. 124: “This moat thorough­
going interpenetration [of fnajU and vijfldrta], indefinably complicated and yet subject 
to systematization, is the self-weaving net of prajU, and vijflina takes no active part in 
it.”
37 In his comparative study of Heidegger and Ch’an, Chang Chung-yuan confirms 
this point: “In Ch’an, ontological experience is identical with the highest aesthetic 
achievement.” The Eastern Buddhist, vol. 5, no. 2 (October 1972), pp. 161-162.
We have taken this brief excursion in order to contrast Ddgen with 
Suzuki so that we may understand two significantly different views of 
Ch’an/Zen soteriology. Although in a grossly oversimplified fashion, we 
can reasonably say that while both Dogen and Suzuki are concerned 
with the soteriological search for spiritual freedom, the former strives for 
rational and ethical ascesis and the latter for an intuitive and aesthetic 
vision. This by no means should imply that what one emphasizes is com­
pletely absent in the other; rather the difference is in degree, not in kind. 
Be that as it may, Dogen’s treatment of the ascetic dynamism of existence/ 
time lends itself to our fundamental reassessment of Ch’an/Zen.
All things considered, man’s creative efforts through his activity- 
unremitting and expression are coeval and consubstantial with Buddha- 
nature. In Ddgen’s expression, “Buddha-nature and becoming a buddha 
always occur contemporaneously” (Sbgz, Bussho'). Man sculptures, so to 
speak, Buddha-nature in and through his being; or to put it differently, 
Buddha-nature chisels itself through man’s existence/time. Ultimately 
speaking, however, “we enact that which is impossible to enact and 
expound that which is impossible to expound” Gjtdji). Existence/ 29
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time as the way of spiritual freedom consists of the living out of such an 
impossible task.
Temporal dynamicity
One last problem remains to considered: the problem of temporal 
movement, or what is commonly called the passage of time (kydryaku 
itfcffi). If temporal succession is philosophically and religiously untenable, 
in what way can we redeem it? Indeed, the common-sense observation 
speaks of time in such a way that the past has already perished, the future 
is yet to come, and the present does not persist. This poses the most in­
tricate enigma of time which St. Augustine rightly discerned: time, 
whether it be past, present, or future, is precisely because it is tending 
not to be.29 Time is ever intangible, immeasurable, and elusive; yet we 
speak of time as though we could measure, calculate, and quantify it, as 
we have seen previously. The critique of the notion of succession should not 
stop at this, however; it must be purified and liberated. This is what 
Dogen does with the concept of the passage of time by rendering it in his 
unique interpretation.
28 77u Confessions of Saint Augustin/, trans. Edward B. Pescy (New York: Collier Books, 
1961), pp. 194-195.
19 It is interesting to note, in this connection, St. Augustine’s observation: “What 
now is clear and plain is, that neither things to come nor part are. Nor is it properly 
said, ‘there be three times, past, present, and to come’: yet perchance it might be pro­
perly said, ‘there be three times; a present of things past, a present of things present, 
and a present of things future.* For these three do exist in some sort, in the soul, but
Time’s inexorable vanishing into nonbeing, according to Ddgcn, is not 
beyond soteriological appropriation. He states:
[The common belief] says that the past has already perished, the 
future is yet to come, and the present does not stay. The past has 
not necessarily already perished, the future is not inevitably yet 
to come, and the present is not inexorably ephemeral. If you 
learn the not-staying, the not-yet, and the no-longer as present, 
future, and past, respectively, you should certainly understand 
the reason that the not-yet is the past, present, and future. [The 
same holds true of the no-longer and the not-staying.] [Sftgz, Juki 
WE]” 28*
66
existence/time
The past, present, and future are distinct from each other, each con­
stituting a discrete reality. But they are no longer divisions of time but 
lived times. The past is not absolutely irretrievable, nor is the future 
ever beyond grasp, nor is the present hopelessly transient; the three 
periods, as lived realities, interpenetrate each other, presenting themselves 
as possibilities for man’s creativity, renewal, and transformation.
The functional complexity in which these three periods are appropriated 
in the temporal passage of the present constitutes the very mystery of 
existence/time. This is characterized by Dogen, for example, as follows: 
“Existence/time has the characteristic of temporal passage: namely, it 
moves from today to tomorrow, from today to yesterday, from yesterday 
to today, from today to today, from tomorrow to tomorrow. For the 
passage of time is the quality of time” (Sbgz, Uji). He also observes: 
“The hour of the horse [n a.m. — I p.m.] and the hour of the sheep 
[i p.m. —3 p.m.], arranged in the world now, are what they are by 
virtue of thusness of their abiding in the Dharma-situation, ascending 
and descending, up and down [in the realization of existence/time]” 
(^g, tjp)*  The three periods of the past, present, and future, or the 
twelve hours such as the hour of the horse and the hour of the sheep, 
are no longer conceived of in terms of the common-sense view, but are 
now sacralized in epochal realization so that they coexist with, inter­
penetrate each other, and integrate into a unique living complex of the 
temporal passage of the present.
Dogen provides us with an intriguing analogy in this connection: 
“The truth of yesterday and today is [comparable to] that moment in 
which we enter mountains and look upon tens of thousands of peaks at 
a glance. Time does not pass” (Sbgz, Uji). All time is seen simultaneously 
in one single viewing. The passage of time is neither a succession nor 
a span of now-moments; rather, it is the epochal dynamicity of the 
absolute present. In this regard, the passage of time is the nonpassage of 
time. In this arc the psychic deposits of the past, the anticipativc pos­
sibilities of the future, and the feelings and thoughts of the present, 
whether conscious, unconscious, or otherwise, all fulfilled conjointly. 
Here again we are tempted to allude to Heidegger’s “epochal abundance
otherwise do I not see them; present of things past, memory; present of things present, 
sight; present of things future, expectation. If thus we be permitted to speak, I see three 
times, and I confess there are three.” St. Augustine, op. oil., p. 198.
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of transmutations” in his analysis of time and being.30 At any rate, we 
must remind ourselves of DSgen’s intention that the analogy of viewing 
myriad peaks at a glance is given not in a visionary context but in an 
ascetic context.
30 Heidegger, ofi. eit., p. g.
Still another analogy is given:
Speaking of the passage of time, we should not construe it as 
something like a storm passing from east to west, or from west 
to east. The world, neither motionless nor changeless, is of 
temporal movement. Temporal movement, then, is like the 
spring. Myriad events take place in the spring, and they are 
called temporal movement. It should be noted that it passes 
without anything outside itself. For example, the temporal move­
ment of the spring operates necessarily in and through the spring 
itself. Temporal movement is not the spring, but because of its 
being the temporal movement of the spring, it is now consum­
mated in the Way at this particular time of the spring. This 
should be understood carefully. The ordinary people, as they 
see the passage of time, think that the objective environment 
exists independently, and temporal passage, as a form of active 
subject, traverses eastward through hundreds of thousands 
of worlds and aeons. Such understanding is due to the lack of 
singleminded devotion to the study of the Buddha-way. [Sbgz, 
Uji]
The key statement in this quote is “it passes without anything outside 
itself.” From the standpoint of existence/time the spring passes through 
the spring in the spring, but from that of the succession of now-moments 
it does not. Thus, hues, shapes, sounds, and fragrances of spring, together 
with all dharmas of the spatio-temporal world, are crystallized in the 
temporal dynamicity of a single dharma, i.e., spring. Continuity, move­
ment, duration, and some cognate ideas implied here refer to such a 
dynamicity of existence/time as the present, in which the self and the world 
are incessantly transformed and renewed in total exertion.
The lived quality of the present as temporal dynamicity can be di­
visible into earlier, middle, and later phases, or into new and old, or into
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past, present, and future; but the temporal dynamicity itself is not divided. 
This is why Dogen says in connection with his analysis of the moon:
... you should understand thoroughly that even though there 
was the moon last night, the moon you see tonight is not last 
night’s moon, and that tonight’s moon, throughout its beginning, 
middle, and end, is nothing but tonight’s moon. Although there 
arc the moons [of, say, the past, present, and future], the moon 
inheriting the moon has, precisely for this reason, no discri­
mination of old and new. (Sbgz, Tsuki IBM)
The beginning, middle, and end, or the origin, path, and goal, are realized 
as the temporal movement not toward Buddha-nature but of Buddha- 
nature. Both the beginning and the end are realized in the path. Thus 
the origin, the path, and the goal are one through their total exertion in 
temporal dynamicity. For this reason, Dogen has this to say: “Arising is 
nothing but arising in its beginning, middle, and end.... Perishing also 
is nothing but perishing in its beginning, middle, and end” (5^z, Kaiin- 
zammai). The dynamicity of time is Buddha-nature’s ascesis itself.
From the foregoing observations it becomes evident that the temporal 
dynamicity in question does not imply in the slightest any hierarchical 
model of time and eternity or any evolutionary model of sequential time. 
That is, Ddgen’s conception of temporal movement has nothing to do 
with a horizontal or vertical, evolutionary or hierarchical, envisionment 
of reality. Indeed, Dogen felicitously puts it: “The times ancient and 
modern do not pile up, nor do they line up” (Sbgz, Uji).
This can be shown in several ways in relation to Dogen’s view of 
existence/time. For one thing, Dogen argues that Buddha-nature is not 
something that will be realized in some future time if and when a right 
season arrives, as in the case of a seed that grows into a plant and bears 
fruits.31 DSgen’s conception of Buddha-nature does not permit evolu­
tionary processes in spiritual freedom, say, from the inferior to the superior, 
from the imperfect to the perfect, or from the hidden to the manifest, 
all of which arc invariably associated with the image of the linear progres­
sion. This is clear from the following statement: “To say ‘if time arrives’ 
is tantamount to declaring that time has already arrived” (Sbgz, Bussho). 
’* Sbgz, Busshb.
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Dogen thus unequivocally rejects any implications whatsoever of degrees, 
levels, means-end, and the like, in conceiving his idea of realization.
In the same vein Dogcn observes in the course of his analysis of moral 
causation (inga : “Cause is not before and effect is not after; the cause 
is perfect and the effect is perfect. Cause is nondual, Dharma is nondual; 
effect is nondual, Dharma is nondual. Though effect is occasioned by 
cause, they are not before or after, because the before and the after are 
nondual in the Way’’ (Sbgz, Shoaku-makusa Cause and effect,
it is unmistakably clear, are not sequentially arranged as in conventional 
thinking, but the absolute events of “wondrous cause” (mytin and 
“wondrous effect” (mybka &&)32 in the living context of temporal 
dynamicity. In short, both cause and effect are transformed into epochal 
events of temporal movement.
Such a mode of thinking is reflected also in his notion of “the Way’s 
ring of activity-unremitting” (gytji-dbkan frJWtW). Ddgen writes:
The great Way of buddhas/patriarchs is constituted invariably 
by supreme activity-unremitting which continues as the ring of 
the Way [with no beginning and no end], never interrupted. 
Aspiration-for-enlightenmcnt, practice, wisdom, and nirvana 
never allow the slightest interval between them, thus going 
on and on in the Way’s ring of activity-unremitting. [Sbgz, Gyoji]
And he also states:
It is through our activity-unremitting that this ring of the 
Way is possessed of its meritorious power; [also] it is through this 
[activity-unremitting] that buddhas/patriarchs each have stayed 
as buddhas, transcended themselves as buddhas, cogitated as 
buddhas, and perfected themselves as buddhas, without any in­
terruption. [Sbgz, Gybji]
It is significant to observe that Dogen here associates this uninterrupted 
perpetuation of the Way’s activity-unremitting with the image of a ring 
rather than a straight line. Yet it is not exactly a cyclic view of eternal 
recurrence, much less a linear view of progression. As the Way of activity- 
unremitting exerts itself totally, it pulsates concentrically in its Dharma­
situation, from an absolute present to an absolute present in the absolute
S1 Sbgz, Shoaku-makusa.
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present, from realization to realization in realization. For this reason, 
progression, if any, is that of such time within itself through itself to 
itself.
A further explication of this view can be seen in what Ddgen calls “the 
task of going beyond Buddha” (bukkojoji &[6]±W). It is defined as reaching 
Buddha and advancing further to meet Buddha.33 This may sound very 
much like a vertical, hierarchical way of thinking; but Dogen’s view is 
not. Here once again, the movement of advancing or reaching is strictly 
the matter of realization within itself through itself to itself. It is not an 
ascending of time to eternity through the degrees of being. D6gen has 
this to say:
33 Sbgz, Bukkdjiji.
The man of going beyond Buddha is none other than non­
Buddha. When you wonder what non-Buddha might be like, 
think [of the following statements]: non-Buddha is so called 
not because he exists before buddhas, not because he exists after 
buddhas; nor is non-Buddha what he is because he transcends 
buddhas. It is solely because non-Buddha goes beyond Buddha: 
“non-Buddha” is so symbolized because of casting off Buddha’s 
countenance and casting off Buddha’s body-mind. [Sbgz, 
Bukkojoji]
The ever-unccasing casting off of Buddha’s countenance and of Buddha’s 
body-mind constitutes “reaching” and “advancing” in ongoing enlight­
enment. The task of going beyond Buddha, then, is the Way’s manner 
of unremitting self-renewal and self-transformation through its ascesis.
In this paper we have examined some salient aspects of DSgen’s treatment 
of existence and time as the way of spiritual freedom. In our analysis and 
exposition, we have seen that Dogen is more explicit in the use of the 
language of ascesis than that of vision, without necessarily rejecting the 
latter: thus his thought points to the path of ascesis beyond that of vision. 
As we have alluded to frequently, Buddha-nature (or original enlight­
enment) is not given, that is, not preexistent or gratuitous, but is to be 
used, appropriated, and cast off in and through the activity-unremitting/ 
expression of a particular, historical existence. In Dogen, Buddha-nature 
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is the principle of such an ascesis that calls for man’s and the world’s 
creative efforts, not the principle of vision that acquiesces the given 
reality. Responsiveness and openness to new horizons and new depths 
of reality are essentially the modes of ascesis which demands concrete 
historical and moral actions. Thus self/world and Buddha-nature are 
alike constantly cast off, renewed, and transformed; the reality of cx- 
istencc/time, however tragic and painful it may be, constitutes the self­
realization and self-transformation of Buddha-nature. By way of con­
cluding this paper, the following few points additionally deserve mention.
The view of existence/time, abstruse and philosophical as it may 
appear, is, in the final analysis, the philosophical foundation of zazen- 
only, the prototypal ascesis which is the matrix of Ddgen’s religious- 
philosophical thought. Although we did not fully discuss the idea of zazen- 
only in this paper, this should not be construed as implying its nonessen­
tiality in any manner. On the contrary, this paper has throughout assumed 
the centrality of zazen-only as the backdrop of its investigation. All in 
all, Ddgen’s view of existence/time is the direct product of the practice 
of zazen-only.
We have seen Ddgen’s philosophical and soteriological sensitivity to 
the existential tensions of opposites and polarities, which many mystically 
oriented traditions including Buddhism tended to tone down. To Dogen 
life and reality were essentially paradoxical. On the other hand, this 
sensitivity centered mainly around his view of a radical individuality; 
as a result, concern with the interaction and interdependence of dharmas 
and individuals in the context of dependent origination was less prominent 
than it should have been.
Ddgen’s elitist approach to ascesis had to do with Dharma for the sake 
of Dharma and, more specifically, with the monastic way of life for 
professional monks; thus it ruthlessly rejected even the slightest accom­
modation to the frailties, ambiguities, and bonds of the common mortals. 
Not the absence of compassion, but on the contrary, this was no doubt 
Ddgen’s mode of expressing the age-old bodhisattva ideal of “seeking 
bodhi above and saving sentient beings below” (jogu-bodai geke-shujo 
Nevertheless, while Dogen emphasized a concrete his­
torical and moral responsibility, the labyrinthine involvement of the 
ideal of compassion in the ambiguities of existence was rather on the 
periphery of such a religion of monks.
As we have intimated before, Dogen’s works, particularly the ShBbSgenzi, 
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are pregnant in poetic sensibilities and expressions, and no student of 
Ddgen can fail to recognize them. The aesthetic dimension of spiritual 
freedom, however, is rather subdued, and even muffled, by and large. 
The integration of the ethical and the aesthetic, or of art and morality, 
remains to be a problem in Dogen’s thought, as much as it is in the thought 
of D. T. Suzuki.
These reservations notwithstanding, DSgen’s religious and metaphysical 
insights into both the temporality of existence/time and its ascetic nature 
and function in the domain of spiritual freedom will no doubt be a lasting 
contribution to the history of ideas in general and to the history of Buddhist 
thought in particular.
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